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Diagnosis-Based Risk Adjustment for Medicare Capitation Payments 
Randall P. Ellis, Ph.D., Gregory C. Pope, M.S., Lisa I. Iezzoni, M.D., M.Sc., John Z. Ayanian, M.D., M.P.P., 
David W. Bates, M.D., M.Sc., Helen Burstin, M.D., M.P.H., and Arlene S. Ash, Ph.D. 
Using 1991-92 data for a 5-percent 
Medicare sample, we develop, estimate, and 
evaluate risk-adjustment models that utilize 
diagnostic information from both inpatient 
and ambulatory claims to adjust payments 
for aged and disabled Medicare enrollees. 
Hierarchical coexisting conditions (HCC) 
models achieve greater explanatory power 
than diagnostic cost group (DCG) models by 
taking account of multiple coexisting medical 
conditions. Prospective models predict aver-
age costs of individuals with chronic condi-
tions nearly as well as concurrent models. All 
models predict medical costs far more accu-
rately than the current health maintenance 
organization (HMO) payment formula. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1970s, Medicare has 
encouraged beneficiaries to enroll in 
HMOs, believing that they are a cost-saving 
alternative to the fee-for-service (FFS) sec-
tor. Initially reimbursed on an FFS basis, 
since the mid-1980s HMOs have been able 
to enter into at-risk contracts with the 
Health Care Financing Administration 
(HCFA). Premium payments to these at-
risk HMOs are based on 95 percent of the 
adjusted average per capita cost (AAPCC) 
of Medicare beneficiaries participating in 
the traditional FFS Medicare program. The 
AAPCC, calculated annually by the Office 
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of the Actuary at HCFA, considers HMO 
enrollees' age, sex, welfare status, and 
whether or not they were in a nursing 
home. In addition, the relative cost weight 
calculated using these four demographic 
factors is adjusted using a geographic fac-
tor based on average costs of FFS benefici-
aries in the counties served by the HMO. 
Since its implementation, the AAPCC 
has prompted concerns about its fairness 
and accuracy (Eggers and Prihoda, 1982; 
Lubitz and Prihoda, 1984; Beebe, Lubitz, 
and Eggers, 1985). Numerous studies have 
demonstrated that the AAPCC explains 
only about one percent of total variability in 
annual costs across Medicare beneficiaries 
(Ash et al., 1989; Newhouse, 1986). 
Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. (Hill 
and Brown, 1990) found that all 98 HMOs 
studied experienced favorable selection: 
The costs of HMO enrollees were less than 
costs of non-HMO enrollees in the year 
prior to HMO enrollment. It has also been 
demonstrated (Brown et al., 1988; 1986; 
1993; Brown and Langwell, 1987) that 
Medicare HMOs on average had lower 
mortality, and that HMO disenrollees had 
systematically higher costs than Medicare 
beneficiaries remaining in the FFS sector. 
Such findings have spurred interest in 
improving the AAPCC. The U.S. General 
Accounting Office (1994) concluded that 
major changes are needed in the pro-
gram's methods, including implementation 
of a health status risk adjuster. 
A variety of alternatives to the AAPCC 
have been proposed (Epstein and 
Cumella, 1988; Ash et al., 1989; Anderson 
et al., 1989). These alternatives differ in 
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the type of information used to predict 
future costs. Epstein and Cumella classify 
potential adjusters for revising the 
AAPCC into six categories: perceived 
health status, functional health status, 
prior utilization, clinical descriptors, 
sociodemographic characteristics, and 
additional predictors. 
Perceived health status and functional 
health status measures require expensive, 
ongoing surveys. In addition, this inform-
ation has generally had only moderate pre-
dictive power, can be subjective, and 
requires substantial new data collection 
before introduction (e.g., Thomas and 
Lichtenstein, 1986; Whitmore et al., 1989; 
Schauffler, Howland, and Cobb, 1992). 
New sociodemographic characteristics and 
additional predictors are either unattrac-
tive conceptually (e.g., mortality rates) or 
have only limited predictive power (e.g., 
whether or not the beneficiary has a dri-
ver's license or lives alone). 
Prior utilization measures include 
expenditures, number of outpatient visits, 
number of hospitalizations, or nursing 
home use. These have been shown to pro-
vide the highest predictive power of any 
risk adjusters (van Vliet and van de Ven, 
1990; Thomas and Lichtenstein, 1986; 
Beebe, Lubitz, and Eggers, 1985; 
Anderson et al., 1986; 1989). However, 
prior utilization measures suffer from 
four weaknesses: (1) The necessary 
information (e.g., nursing home use) is 
generally not available; (2) the necessary 
data cannot be routinely measured within 
an HMO setting (e.g., levels of expendi-
ture); (3) payments based on these meas-
ures (e.g., the number of admissions or 
visits) may create perverse incentives, 
inappropriately encouraging HMOs to 
hospitalize or provide outpatient treat-
ment; (4) payments based on such meas-
ures may be unfair to HMOs that provide 
good care with less intensive utilization. 
Risk-adjustment models based on diag-
nostic information appear best able to over-
come the previously noted weaknesses. 
The information needed is available for 
large populations; diagnoses can potential-
ly be measured (and in many cases already 
are) in HMOs; incentives and inequities 
can be mitigated. 
One diagnosis-based model, DCGs, 
forms an important precursor to the work 
described here (Ash et al., 1986; 1989). 
The DCG approach uses diagnostic 
information from hospitalizations occur-
ring during a base year to classify bene-
ficiaries into one of eight (later increased 
to nine) DCGs. These eight DCGs, 
together with demographic characteris-
tics, are then used to predict health costs 
in a subsequent year the prediction year. 
Since the original work by Ash et al. 
(1986), the DCG model has been further 
enhanced as described in Ellis and Ash 
(1988; 1989; 1995); Ash, Ellis, and Iezzoni 
(1990); and Ellis (1990). Ellis and Ash 
(1995) present findings from the DCG 
models that are the point of departure for 
this article. 
This article develops, estimates, and 
evaluates risk-adjustment models which 
differ in the information used to predict 
1992 Medicare payments. Comparisons 
are made with two models: an AAPCC-like 
model that classifies people using only 
demographic information, and a DCG 
model that also uses the principal inpatient 
diagnoses from the preceding year. Four 
extensions to these models are examined. 
The first extension adds secondary diag-
noses from hospital inpatient bills, diag-
noses from hospital outpatient claims, and 
diagnoses from bills for ambulatory or 
inpatient physician services to principal 
hospital inpatient diagnoses. Using a DCG 
framework, individuals are classified based 
on the single highest cost diagnosis 
recorded for a person during the year. 
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The second extension expands the risk-
adjustment framework to account for multi-
ple medical conditions that persons may 
experience. We call this new framework the 
hierarchical coexisting conditions (HCC) 
model. The HCC model organizes closely 
related conditions into hierarchies. For con-
ditions within a disease hierarchy, a person is 
characterized only by the most serious con-
dition. Across such hierarchies, persons may 
be classified as having multiple conditions. 
The third extension uses life-sustaining 
medical procedures to classify individuals. 
Relatively non-discretionary procedures 
used primarily to sustain the life of severe-
ly ill patients and associated with high 
future medical costs are utilized to predict 
costs in HCC model variants. 
The fourth extension is that all models 
are estimated and evaluated both prospec-
tively—using diagnoses (and other inform-
ation) to predict subsequent year pay-
ments—and concurrently—using diag-
noses to predict payments in the same 
year.1 Both the DCG and HCC diagnostic 
classifications are redefined to reflect dif-
ferences in the expenditures associated 
with a diagnosis in the year it is made ver-
sus the following year. 
DATA 
Our analysis uses a 5-percent sample of 
aged and disabled beneficiaries eligible for 
Medicare in 1991 or 1992, obtained from 
HCFA data files. The sample includes only 
people with a full 12 months of eligibility for 
both Part A and Part B coverage in 1991. We 
eliminated anyone dying during 1991, 
becoming eligible during 1991 or 1992, HMO 
enrollees, or beneficiaries in HCFA's End 
Stage Renal Disease Program. Appropriate 
statistical adjustments are made to account 
for partial year expenditures of those who 
died during 1992 (Ellis and Ash, 1995). 
1Concurrent models are sometimes called "retrospective" models. 
We use a split sample design to avoid 
overfitting the data and biasing measures 
of goodness of fit. We randomly divided 
our 5-percent sample into 2.5-percent 
model development (N=680,188) and 
model validation (N=680,438) halves. 
These large sample sizes are crucial for 
accurately estimating the cost of expen-
sive, but rare, medical conditions. 
Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable was total 
1992 Medicare program expenditures for 
each beneficiary, excluding beneficiary 
deductibles and copayments. Medicare-
covered expenditures for hospital inpa-
tient, hospital outpatient, physician, home 
health, hospice, skilled nursing facility, lab-
oratory, durable medical equipment, and 
other services were all included. For inpa-
tient services subject to Medicare's 
prospective payment system, diagnosis-
related-group payments were aggregated 
with direct teaching, outlier, and organ 
transplant payments. To be consistent with 
future Medicare payment methods, 1992 
physician payments from a fully-phased-in 
Medicare fee schedule (resource based 
relative value scale [RBRVS]) were simu-
lated.2 Actual reimbursement was used to 
capture other payments. Non-Medicare-
covered services, including most nursing 
home care and outpatient drugs, are not 
included in our analysis. Deductibles, 
copayments, and non-covered services 
account for roughly one-half of the total 
health expenditures of the elderly. 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables used are of 
three types: demographic, diagnostic, and 
procedural. Demographic information is 
2Assignment of fully phased-in RBRVS fees was conducted by 
researchers at Johns Hopkins University under the direction of 
Jonathan Werner, Dr. P.H. 
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included as 12 age-sex cells, based on data 
obtained from Medicare enrollment files for 
January 1, 1992. Medicare beneficiaries eligi-
ble for coverage because of disability repre-
sent less than 9 percent of our sample. This 
sample size was too small for developing sep-
arate risk-adjustment models. We pooled dis-
abled beneficiaries with aged beneficiaries 
rather than excluding them. Differential costs 
for the aged and disabled populations are 
implicitly incorporated by age because dis-
abled beneficiaries are under age 65. 
Diagnoses were obtained from hospital inpa-
tient, hospital outpatient, and physician 
claims, including both header and line item 
diagnoses. Diagnoses are coded according to 
the International Classification of Diseases, 
Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-
CM) (Public Health Service and Health Care 
Financing Administration, 1980). Diagnoses 
from Medicare Part B bills submitted by 
non-physicians, such as laboratories and 
medical equipment suppliers, were excluded. 
Selected procedures coded using the Current 
Procedural Terminology, 4th Edition (CPT-4) 
classification system were also extracted 
from Part B claims. 
Grouping Diagnostic Codes 
Given that there are more than 14,000 
valid ICD-9-CM diagnostic codes, an 
important first step is to group ICD-9-CM 
codes into aggregates, building on the 
approach described in Ash et al. (1989) and 
Ellis and Ash (1995). Starting with the 
104 groups of diagnoses used in this pre-
vious DCG work, the four physician 
authors of this article, in consultation with 
outside specialists, combined ICD-9-CM 
codes into diagnostic groups which we 
refer to as DXGROUPs. Two sets of 
DXGROUPs were formed: principal inpa-
tient DXGROUPs, and all (hospital and 
physician) diagnoses, both inpatient and 
ambulatory, DXGROUPs. The 143 princi-
pal inpatient DXGROUPs are assigned 
from each beneficiary's principal inpatient 
diagnoses only, whereas the 432 all-diag-
noses DXGROUPs are assigned from all 
hospital and physician diagnoses. Each 
reimbursable ICD-9-CM code is assigned 
to one and only one principal inpatient 
DXGROUP, and one and only one all-diag-
nosis DXGROUP. 
The physicians formed DXGROUPs 
according to the following criteria: 
• Groups should separate diagnoses by 
anticipated costliness. 
• Groups should have a sample size of at 
least 500. 
• Groups should be clinically homoge-
nous and meaningful. 
• Alternative codes that can be used for 
the same medical condition should be 
grouped together. 
• Each reimbursable ICD-9-CM code 
should belong to one and only one group. 
• Each all-diagnoses group should be 
wholly contained within a single inpa-
tient group. 
The sample size goal of 500 corresponds 
to a relative standard error of mean expen-
ditures of about 10 percent, which was seen 
as acceptably accurate. Where the second 
and third criteria conflicted—sample size 
versus clinical cogency—priority was given 
to clinical cogency. Thus, a separate 
DXGROUP for HIV/AIDS was formed even 
though it contains fewer than 500 benefici-
aries. Special emphasis was placed on dis-
tinguishing (i.e., separately grouping) the 
very highest cost diagnoses; less emphasis 
was accorded to making fine clinical distinc-
tions among lower cost diagnoses. The 
DXGROUPs necessarily reflect the frequen-
cy of medical conditions among Medicare's 
elderly and disabled population. Thus, for 
example, few distinctions were made 
among pregnancy, childbirth, and child-
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hood disorders. In forming DXGROUPs, 
1,835 ICD-9-CM diagnostic codes were 
employed: 1,021 (56 percent) are three-digit 
codes, 642 (35 percent) are four-digit splits, 
and 172 (9 percent) are five-digit splits. 
When a three-digit code is placed in a 
DXGROUP, all four- and five-digit codes that 
begin with the same three digits are 
assigned to the same DXGROUP; and simi-
larly for the four-digit code assignments. 
Groupings were reviewed by seven other 
physicians spanning a range of specialties 
from the Boston area and Indiana 
University, as well as by two medical coding 
experts, and were compared with other clin-
ical groupings of diagnostic codes (e.g., 
Elixhauser, Andrews, and Fox, 1993). In 
most cases, DXGROUPs correspond to spe-
cific medical conditions. Examples of all-
diagnoses DXGROUPs are lung cancer, dia-
betes without complications, Parkinson's 
disease, viral hepatitis, aortic aneurysm, 
and asthma. 
DEMOGRAPHIC AND DCG MODELS 
Table 1 summarizes our three classes of 
risk-adjustment models: demographic 
models, DCG models, and HCC models. 
Demographic Model 
We consider one model which uses only 
demographic information: an AAPCC-like 
model that predicts Medicare payments 
using twelve age-sex categorical variables 
and a dummy variable for Medicaid enroll-
ment Because disability eligibility coincides 
with being under age 65, we do not include a 
separate indicator for disability status. 
Institutional status is used in the current 
AAPCCs but was unavailable to us. None of 
our models includes geographic factors 
similar to the county-level adjustments of 
the AAPCC. 
DCG Models 
The DCG modeling framework is 
described in detail in Ash et al. (1989) and 
Ellis and Ash (1995). Creation of a DCG 
model takes place in four stages. The first 
stage is to map ICD-9-CM diagnostic codes 
into DXGROUPs, as described. The sec-
ond stage is to run the DXGROUPs 
through a sorting algorithm that places 
each DXGROUP in a relatively homoge-
nous cost group, or DCG. The sorting 
algorithm ranks the DXGROUPs by 
mean expenditures. The highest cost 
DXGROUPs are grouped into the highest 
numbered DCG. The DXGROUPs are then 
re-ranked by mean expenditures, exclud-
ing people with the costliest conditions, 
who have already been classified into the 
highest numbered DCG. Each successive-
ly lower-numbered DCG includes 
DXGROUPs not already classified into 
higher-numbered DCGs, with the lowest 
numbered DCG including the lowest cost 
set of conditions. A third stage is to use 
clinical judgment to reclassify poorly 
grouped DXGROUPs into DCGs. Poorly 
grouped DXGROUPs are modified for 
three reasons: to use judgment where sam-
ple sizes are small, to improve clinical plau-
sibility, and to improve incentives. The final 
stage of development is to calibrate pay-
ment parameters through estimation of a 
multiple regression equation. For this 
regression, each person is uniquely 
assigned to the most expensive DCG to 
which any of their diagnoses belong. 
For this article, we present two DCG 
model variants that differ in the type of 
information used to predict payments.3 The 
principal inpatient DCG (PIPDCG) model 
classifies people based on their single high-
est cost principal inpatient diagnosis. The 
PIPDCG model has the simplest data 
3Further DCG and HCC model variations are presented in the 
final report (Ellis et al., 19%). 
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Table 1 
Risk-Adjustment Models 
Model 
Demographic Model 
Adjusted Average 
Per Capita Cost (AAPCC) 
DCG Models 
Principal Inpatient 
Diagnostic Cost 
Group Model (PIPDCG) 
All-Diagnoses Diagnostic 
Cost Group Model (ADDCG) 
HCC Models 
Hierarchical Coexisting 
Conditions Model (HCC) 
Hierarchical Coexisting 
Conditions and Procedures 
Model (HCCP) 
Hierarchical Coexisting 
Conditions, Procedures, 
and Hospitalizations 
Model (HCCPH) 
Description 
Includes age, sex, and Medicaid 
status, as used in Medicare's 
current method of paying HMOs. 
Pays for the single highest-cost 
principal inpatient diagnosis in 
addition to AAPCC factors. 
Pays for the single highest cost 
hospital or physician diagnosis in 
addition to AAPCC factors. 
34 (prospective) or 44 (concurrent) 
Hierarchical Coexisting Conditions, 
plus age and sex. 
40 (prospective) or 44 (concurrent) HCCs, 
11 Procedure-Based HCCs, 
plus age and sex. 
40 (prospective) or 39 (concurrent) HCCs, 
11 Procedure-Based HCCs, 
and 3 (prospective) or 5 (concurrent) 
Principal Inpatient HCCs, 
plus age and sex. 
Maximum Number of 
Diagnostic Categories 
for Individuals* 
0 
1 
1 
23** 
33 
36 
*Prospective or concurrent version of the model. 
** For concurrent HCC model, maximum number is 25. 
SOURCE: Ellis, R.P., Pope, G.C., lezzoni, L.I., et al., 1996. 
requirement: It can be implemented with 
knowledge of each person's principal inpa-
tient diagnoses only. This is an important 
advantage in circumstances where ambula-
tory or secondary inpatient diagnoses are 
unevenly available, or inaccurate. On the 
other hand, as a payment system, the 
PIPDCG model establishes incentives to 
hospitalize enrollees because only inpatient 
diagnoses are used to classify individuals. 
Also, because the order of inpatient diag-
noses is often somewhat arbitrary, the 
model is open to gaming because providers 
could reorder diagnoses to maximize reim-
bursement. Finally, no diagnostic inform-
ation is available to classify the nearly 80 
percent of Medicare beneficiaries who are 
not hospitalized in a given year. 
The second DCG model presented is the 
all-diagnoses DCG (ADDCG) model. The 
ADDCG model adds secondary inpatient, 
hospital outpatient, and physician diag-
noses (for either inpatients or outpatients) 
to the principal inpatient diagnosis, and 
classifies people based on their single 
highest predicted cost diagnosis, with no 
distinction made as to the source of the 
diagnosis. It classifies all but the approxi-
mately 12 percent of Medicare benefici-
aries who have neither hospital nor physi-
cian medical claims in a year. Because it 
makes no distinction by source of diagno-
sis, it avoids incentives to hospitalize, and it 
does not reward coding proliferation 
because it pays only for the single highest 
cost diagnosis. 
Both prospective and concurrent ver-
sions of the principal inpatient and all diag-
nosis DCGs were developed, for a total of 
four DCG models. Prospective and concur-
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rent DCGs are defined analogously using 
the methods previously described. 
Concurrent DCG models differ from 
prospective DCG models in that people are 
assigned to DXGROUPs and thus to DCGs, 
based on current year rather than previous 
year diagnoses. In our case, concurrent 
models use 1992 diagnoses and prospec-
tive models use 1991 diagnoses, both to 
predict 1992 payments. In addition, the 
mapping of DXGROUPs into DCGs is rede-
fined based on the sorting algorithm 
results for the concurrent DXGROUPs 
rather than the prospective groups. Acute 
conditions having particularly high costs in 
the current year (e.g., heart attack) are 
classified into the highest numbered con-
current DCGs, whereas chronic conditions 
with stable or rising costs over time (e.g., 
cancer) are classified into the highest num-
bered prospective DCGs. 
HCC MODELS 
Rationale for HCC Models 
DCG models predict a person's costli-
ness by identifying his or her single highest 
cost diagnosis. For example, if a person has 
lung cancer, diabetes without complica-
tions, and coronary artery disease, the 
DCG model would consider lung cancer 
only, because lung cancer is the diagnosis 
which predicts the highest future Medicare 
expenditures. Focusing on the single high-
est-cost diagnosis has several virtues: sim-
plicity, less sensitivity to incomplete diag-
nostic coding, and not rewarding prolifera-
tion of diagnostic coding by health plans. 
However, a single diagnosis can describe a 
person's health status only partially. This is 
especially true among elderly and disabled 
Medicare beneficiaries, many of whom 
have multiple chronic health problems. 
In contrast with DCG models, HCC mod-
els characterize health status by consider-
ing multiple coexisting medical conditions. 
Rather than focusing on the highest cost 
condition, HCC models sum the incremen-
tal predicted cost (payment) for each condi-
tion to arrive at the total predicted cost (pay-
ment). HCC models will predict a different 
level of expenditures for a person with lung 
cancer versus a person with lung cancer, 
diabetes, and coronary artery disease. Like 
the DRGs used by Medicare for hospital 
payment, DCGs are mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive: A person belongs to one and 
only one DCG. In contrast, a person may be 
characterized by no HCCs, one HCC, or 
multiple HCCs. 
Defining Coexisting Conditions 
The narrowly defined DXGROUP cate-
gories are inappropriate for additive, multi-
ple condition models. The large number of 
categories creates incentives for coding 
proliferation, i.e., coding as many ICD-9-
CM codes as possible to maximize reim-
bursement. It also raises the danger of 
some conditions being classified into two 
or more different categories, thus being 
paid for more than once. In addition, 
regression parameter estimates are often 
implausible (e.g., negative) or imprecise 
because of small sample sizes. 
To overcome these limitations, the 
physician panel created more aggregated 
groupings of medical conditions. We call 
each such group of DXGROUPs a coexist-
ing condition: coexisting because an indi-
vidual may simultaneously have more than 
one, and condition because the group of 
diagnoses does not necessarily a reflect 
comorbidity (which in clinical terms 
means a related condition). Coexisting 
condition groups combine DXGROUPs 
belonging to a major body system or dis-
ease type by costliness and clinical rela-
tion. The major body systems and disease 
types generally follow those established by 
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the ICD-9-CM coding system (e.g., infec-
tious diseases, neoplasm, mental disor-
ders). Grouping of DXGROUPs by costli-
ness was informed by the DCG assignment 
of DXGROUPs, coefficients from a regres-
sion of Medicare expenditures on the 432 
DXGROUPs, and mean Medicare expendi-
tures by DXGROUP. Existing lists of 
comorbidities were also consulted for guid-
ance (Charlson et al., 1987; Deyo et al., 
1992; Keeler et al., 1990). 
The coexisting condition groups used in 
two prospective HCC models are shown in 
Table 2. Coexisting condition groups were 
also defined for the concurrent HCC model 
(not shown in Table 2), using the same cri-
teria and methods as for the prospective 
groups, except that all analysis was done 
on a concurrent basis. The most significant 
difference between the prospective and 
concurrent HCCs is that new groups were 
created for particularly high cost acute 
conditions, for example, heart attack, cere-
bral hemorrhage, and acute renal failure. 
Before making any exclusions, there are 
81 concurrent HCCs compared with 66 
prospective HCCs. 
Creating Hierarchies 
Hierarchies were created among sub-
sets of the coexisting conditions based on 
clinical judgment. Hierarchies are defined 
among related medical conditions where 
some can be assigned precedence over 
others because they are a more costly or 
clinically significant disease process. 
Coexisting conditions redefined according 
to these hierarchical rules are called 
HCCs. The hierarchies specify that a per-
son with multiple, clinically related coexist-
ing conditions is assigned only to the high-
est ranked among these related coexisting 
conditions. For example, the diabetes hier-
archy specifies that if a person is coded 
into HCC 12, Higher Cost Diabetes, he or 
she may not also be assigned to HCC 13, 
Lower Cost Diabetes. Similarly, a person in 
HCC 4, Metastatic Cancer, is not allowed to 
be in HCC 5, High Cost Cancers, or in any 
of the other six HCCs in the neoplasm hier-
archy. The hierarchical relationships 
among HCCs used in two prospective HCC 
models are indicated in Table 2. 
The hierarchies serve three main func-
tions. First, they improve clinical validity. 
For example, if a person has a more severe 
manifestation of diabetes, characterizing 
that person also with a less serious type of 
diabetes is not clinically useful. Second, the 
hierarchies limit incentives for coding pro-
liferation. Without the hierarchies, a 
provider could be paid more for coding 
both more and less severe diabetes, and 
both metastatic cancer and anatomically 
specific cancer. With the hierarchies, pay-
ment is made only for the most costly HCC 
in a disease hierarchy. Third, the hierar-
chies improve the precision of the estimat-
ed payment weights (regression coeffi-
cients) . With coding of HCCs limited to the 
highest-ranked HCC in a hierarchy, the 
expenditures associated with a disease 
type (e.g., neoplasm or diabetes) are 
loaded onto the highest-ranked conditions, 
rather than being diffused among higher 
and lower cost conditions. A more precise 
estimate of the relative payment weight for 
higher-cost diabetes versus lower-cost 
diabetes is obtained, for instance. 
Procedure Groups 
In addition to using diagnostic inform-
ation, we explored the use of selected medi-
cal procedures for risk adjustment. In gen-
eral, basing payments on procedures was 
considered undesirable because perform-
ance of many procedures is discretionary.4 
4This principle distinguishes HCCs and DCGs from episode unit 
of payment classifications, such as DRGs, which pay more to 
providers who choose discretionary surgical treatments for 
many diagnoses. 
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Table 2 
Prospective Hierarchical Coexisting Conditions Models, With Incremental Payment Weights1 
HCC 
1 
2* 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8* 
12 
13 
14 
17 
18 
19* 
21 
22 
24 
25 
28 
29 
31 
32 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
45 
46 
48 
49 
50* 
51* 
54 
58 
60 
Label 
High-Cost Infectious Diseases 
Moderate-Cost Infectious Diseases 
Metastatic Cancer 
High-Cost Cancers 
Moderate-Cost Cancers 
Lower-Cost Cancers 
Carcinoma in Situ 
High-Cost Diabetes 
Lower-Cost Diabetes 
Protein-Calorie Malnutrition 
Liver Disease 
High-Cost Gastrointestinal Disorders 
Moderate-Cost Gastrointestinal 
Disorders 
Bone Infections 
Rheumatoid Arthritis and Connective 
Tissue Disease 
Aplastic and Acquired Hemolytic 
Anemias 
Blood/Immune Disorders 
Drug and Alcohol Dependence/ 
Psychoses 
Higher-Cost Mental Disorders 
Quadriplegia/Paraplegia 
Higher-Cost Nervous System 
Disorders 
Respiratory Arrest 
Cardiac Arrest/Shock 
Respiratory Failure 
Congestive Heart Failure 
Heart Arrhythmia 
Valvular Heart Disease 
Coronary Artery Disease 
Cerebrovascular Disease 
Vascular Disease 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary 
Disease 
Higher-Cost Pneumonia 
Lower-Cost Pneumonia 
Pleurisy/Fibrosis of Lungs 
Renal Failure 
Chronic Ulcer of Skin 
Hip and Vertebral Fractures 
See notes at end of table. 
Example(s) 
Septicemia, 
HIV/AIDS 
Tuberculosis, 
meningitis 
— 
Lung cancer 
Kidney cancer, 
brain cancer 
Prostate cancer, 
breast cancer 
— 
Hypoglycemic 
coma 
Diabetes without 
complications 
— 
Cirrhosis 
Intestinal 
obstruction 
Ulcer without 
perforation 
Osteomyelitis 
Systemic lupus 
erythematosus 
— 
Hemophilia 
— 
Schizophrenia 
— 
Parkinson's disease, 
multiple sclerosis 
— 
— 
— 
— 
Ventric Tachycardia 
Rheumatic Fever/ 
Heart Disease 
Myocardial 
infarction, 
angina pectoris 
Cerebrovascular 
accident 
Atherosclerosis, 
aneurysm 
Emphysema, 
Asthma 
Pneumococcal 
pneumonia 
Unspecified 
pneumonia 
Black lung disease 
— 
— 
— 
Percent of 
Hierarchy Medicare 
(Rank) Beneficiaries2 
None 
None 
Neoplasm ( 1 ) 
Neoplasm ( 2 ) 
Neoplasm ( 3 ) 
Neoplasm ( 4 ) 
Neoplasm ( 5 ) 
Diabetes ( 1 ) 
Diabetes ( 2 ) 
None 
None 
Gastrointestinal ( 1 ) 
Gastrointestinal ( 2 ) 
None 
None 
Hematological ( 1 ) 
Hematological ( 2 ) 
Mental ( 1 ) 
Mental ( 2 ) 
Neurological ( 1 ) 
Neurological ( 2 ) 
Cardio-respiratory 
arrest ( 1 ) 
Cardio-respiratory 
arrest ( 2 ) 
Cardio-respiratory 
arrest ( 3 ) 
Heart ( 1 ) 
Heart ( 2 ) 
Heart ( 3 ) 
Heart ( 3 ) 
None 
None 
Lung ( 1 ) 
Lung ( 1 a ) 
Lung ( 2 a ) 
Lung ( 3 ) 
None 
None 
None 
1.1 
2.1 
1.3 
0.9 
2.0 
4.8 
0.4 
1.5 
12.0 
0.6 
0.4 
2.5 
7.8 
0.6 
2.6 
0.3 
1.8 
0.7 
4.4 
0.2 
6.3 
0.3 
0.3 
2.5 
9.9 
3.2 
2.4 
13.7 
8.4 
12.1 
11.9 
1.1 
4.4 
1.5 
1.4 
2.5 
2.4 
Incremental Payment 
HCC—Diagnosis 
Only 
$4,116 
— 
6,298 
4,226 
2,168 
910 
— 
3,939 
1,451 
3,961 
4,269 
2,146 
— 
2,111 
1,516 
5,505 
1,337 
2,442 
1,635 
5,609 
1,556 
9,282 
1,759 
2,797 
3,063 
1,333 
804 
1,049 
1,253 
1,114 
1,555 
2,943 
— 
— 
3,454 
2,633 
1,109 
HCCP—Includes 
Procedures 
$3,045 
1,411 
4,332 
3,457 
1,680 
576 
456 
3,871 
1,425 
2,451 
3,971 
1,827 
751 
1,770 
1,442 
4,778 
994 
2,318 
1,603 
4,996 
1,436 
6,561 
1,271 
2,237 
2,873 
1,212 
757 
995 
1,174 
1,015 
1,448 
2,673 
1,104 
801 
2,907 
2,461 
998 
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Table 2—Continued 
Prospective Hierarchical Coexisting Conditions Models, With Incremental Payment Weights1 
HCC 
61 
63* 
64 
Label 
Higher-Cost Injuries and Poisonings 
Complications of Medical and 
Surgical Care 
Coma 
Procedure-Based HCCs 
67* 
68* 
70* 
71* 
72* 
73* 
74* 
77* 
78* 
79* 
80* 
Major Organ Transplant 
Status/History of Major Organ 
Transplant 
Tracheostomy 
Gastrostomy 
Enterostomy 
Artificial Opening Status/Attention 
Machine Dependence 
Venous Access Port 
Chemotherapy 
Dialysis 
Major Surgical Amputations 
Example(s) 
Intracranial injury, 
third-degree bums 
Misadventure to 
patient in surgery 
— 
Heart transplant 
— 
— 
— 
— 
Attention to 
gastrostomy 
Ventilator 
dependence 
— 
— 
— 
Amputation of leg 
Percent of 
Hierarchy Medicare 
(Rank) Beneficiaries2 
None 
None 
None 
Transplant ( 1 ) 
Transplant (2) 
Artificial opening, 
tracheostomy ( 1 ) 
Artificial opening ( 1 ) 
Artificial opening ( 1 ) 
Artificial opening ( 2 ) 
Tracheostomy (2 ) 
None 
None 
None 
None 
2.2 
3.4 
0.3 
0.0 
0.1 
0.1 
0.2 
0.1 
0.4 
1.2 
0.1 
0.8 
0.0 
0.1 
Incremental Payment 
HCC—Diagnosis 
Only 
$1,254 
1,694 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
HCCP—Includes 
Procedures 
$1,052 
709 
1,361 
5,142 
1,156 
24,474 
5,022 
5,119 
2,236 
2,190 
7,139 
4,642 
16,586 
2,607 
*Not included in hierarchical coexisting conditions (HCC) payment model. 
1
 Payment models also include 12 age and sex cells. Age and sex weight must be added to sum of HCC weights to obtain total payment. 
2Percent of sample in category after application of hierarchical restrictions. 
SOURCE (for payment weights): 1992 (expenditures) and 1991 (diagnoses) Medicare claims. 
A few procedures, however, are so invasive 
and unpleasant that physicians are 
extremely unlikely to be influenced by 
financial considerations. These procedures 
will be used only as a last resort to sustain 
life in severely ill patients. The four physi-
cian authors identified groups of life-sus-
taining procedures appropriate for inclu-
sion in risk-adjustment models. Specific 
CPT-4 codes were selected for each type of 
procedure. The physicians selected proce-
dures according to the following criteria: 
• The procedure should indicate a severe-
ly ill patient. 
• The procedure should be associated 
with high expected medical costs. 
• Little discretion should apply to the deci-
sion to use the procedure. 
Ten groups of procedure codes and five 
groups of related ICD-9-CM V-Codes were 
identified: major organ transplants, dial-
ysis, chemotherapy, radiation therapy, 
mechanical ventilation, major surgical 
amputations, and creation of artificial open-
ings in the body (e.g., tracheostomy). The 
specific procedure groups included in our 
final HCC models are shown near the end 
of Table 2. Also shown in Table 2 are the 
hierarchies created among the procedure 
groups. These were established using cri-
teria analogous to those for the diagnostic 
hierarchies. When procedure groups are 
included, we call the model the 
Hierarchical Coexisting Conditions and 
Procedures (HCCP) model. The same pro-
cedure groupings are used in both 
prospective and concurrent versions of the 
HCCP model. 
Inpatient Diagnostic Groups 
We also explored the incremental predic-
tive ability of using principal inpatient diag-
noses for beneficiaries who are hospital-
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ized. In our prospective HCC models, we 
found that the predictive power of hospital-
izations was concentrated in a relatively 
small number of diagnoses. Nearly one-half 
of all admissions were not associated with 
higher incremental cost in the subsequent 
year. Most of the incremental explanatory 
power of previous year hospitalization is 
concentrated in just a few principal inpa-
tient conditions: chronic obstructive pul-
monary disease, congestive heart failure, 
metastatic cancer, and high-cost mental dis-
orders. We consolidated the diagnoses 
associated with hospitalization in the previ-
ous year into 5 groups based on similarity 
of their incremental costliness (i.e., their 
regression coefficients). With the addition 
of the inpatient groups, the HCCP model is 
known as the HCCPH model, with the H 
denoting hospitalizations. 
Not surprisingly, hospitalization is a very 
strong predictor of total Medicare expendi-
tures in the current year. However, there is 
a wide range in the costs of enrollees who 
are hospitalized according to diagnosis. We 
reclassified principal inpatient diagnoses 
into six groups based on current year 
incremental costliness. Together with the 
concurrent diagnostic and the procedure 
groups, these inpatient groups define the 
concurrent HCCPH model. Altogether, 
then, we define six HCC models: prospec-
tive and concurrent versions of the HCC, 
HCCP, and HCCPH models. 
Creating Appropriate Incentives 
High explanatory power of a risk-adjust-
ment model is desirable in order to create 
incentives for HMOs to enroll and appro-
priately treat high-cost individuals. Yet 
diagnosis-based risk-adjustment models 
can also create undesirable incentives for 
providers. Provider incentives that are of 
concern are primarily of two types: (1) 
incentives for coding of diagnoses (and 
procedures) on Medicare claims; and (2) 
incentives for the provision of appropriate 
and cost-effective medical care. Generally, 
there is a tradeoff between explanatory 
power and provider incentives. The incen-
tive facing providers can often be improved 
by reducing the types of information used 
for payment, but improved incentives come 
at the expense of ability to predict expendi-
tures accurately. 
In addition to incentives, one is con-
cerned with fairness to providers and 
health plans. Ideally, payments should be 
relatively insensitive to variations in coding 
practices and to treatment choices such as 
rates of hospitalization, institutionalization, 
and procedures. At the same time, to be 
fair, a payment system should accurately 
reflect actual differences in enrollee health 
status across health plans. Thus, fairness 
demands power in explaining exogenous 
health status differences across plans 
while minimizing use of endogenous 
information on factors that are affected by 
plan style of care and coding practices. 
To improve model incentives and fair-
ness, we selected only a subset of HCCs for 
the models presented in this article. The 
goals of these exclusions were to reduce: 
• sensitivity to variations in provider cod-
ing practices and medical care utilization; 
• sensitivity to imprecise coding; 
• susceptibility to provider manipulation 
of coding practices to maximize reim-
bursement, such as upcoding and cod-
ing proliferation; and 
• incentives for excessive diagnostic test-
ing or screening to identify health plan 
enrollees with reimbursable diagnoses. 
We excluded from the models categories 
of diagnosis, procedure, or hospitalization 
that were not predictive of significantly 
higher Medicare expenditures, medically 
ambiguous, have relatively ambiguous cri-
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teria for coding on claims, or are difficult to 
audit or verify. These decisions were based 
on both clinical judgment and empirical 
evidence on the future costliness of diag-
noses. Our final, most preferred prospec-
tive HCC model includes only 34 of the ini-
tial 66 HCC diagnostic categories consid-
ered. Our final concurrent HCC model 
includes 44 of 81 initial categories. 
Similarly, the HCCP and HCCPH models 
reflect considerable exclusion of HCCs to 
improve incentives.5 Many of the most 
common diagnoses (osteoarthritis, high 
cholesterol, hypertension, symptoms) are 
eliminated, with minor loss in explanatory 
power, to focus on the less frequent high-
cost diagnoses (Table 2). Forty-three per-
cent of our sample of Medicare benefici-
aries had no diagnoses remaining in the 
final prospective HCC model, and are clas-
sified only by age and sex. 
Parameter Estimation 
Multiple linear regression was used to 
estimate the parameters of each of the risk 
model variants described in Table 1. 
Annualized 1992 Medicare program expen-
ditures were regressed against dummy 
variables that reflect the diagnostic, proce-
dure, and hospitalization categories plus 
the 12 age-sex cells used in the current 
AAPCC methodology. For the prospective 
models, diagnoses, procedures, and hospi-
talizations were derived from 1991 
Medicare claims; for the concurrent mod-
els, they were derived from 1992 claims. 
Regressions are weighted by the portion of 
the year each beneficiary is alive and eligi-
ble for Medicare. Because of the large 
number of parameters and alternative 
specifications, we present parameters from 
only two regression models in Table 2, the 
prospective HCC and HCCP models. 
5For an expanded discussion of alternative specifications, see 
Ellis et al. (1996). 
The coefficients of both prospective HCC 
models have good face validity. For example, 
metastatic cancer has a larger incremental 
cost than high-cost cancer, which has a larg-
er incremental cost than moderate-cost can-
cer. Clinically more significant disorders 
have larger incremental costs than less sig-
nificant disorders. Quadriplegia and paraple-
gia, metastatic cancer, liver disease, and res-
piratory arrest have some of the largest coef-
ficients, for example. The life-sustaining pro-
cedures identify very costly patients, espe-
cially tracheostomy and dialysis. Payment 
weights are measured accurately: relative 
standard errors of coefficients in the two 
payment models are small, 10 percent or 
less, with only a few exceptions. Coefficients 
from the HCCPH and concurrent HCC mod-
els are presented in Ellis et al. (1996). 
Concurrent model parameters display simi-
lar patterns, also with good face validity, but 
tend to be considerably larger, especially for 
certain acute conditions. 
Explanatory Power 
In this section we evaluate the predictive 
ability of our risk-adjustment models. To 
avoid overstating predictive power because 
of overfitting, all of our predictive power 
statistics are calculated using the valida-
tion half of our sample. 
Percentage of Variation Explained 
Table 3 summarizes the explanatory 
power of the eleven risk adjustment mod-
els as measured by the R2 statistic. The R2 
measures the proportion of the total vari-
ance in the dependent variable that is 
explained by the explanatory variables. 
Prospective Models 
The left-hand column of Table 3 presents 
R2 from the prospective risk-adjustment 
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Table 3 
Percentage of Variance (R2) Explained by 
Selected Models: Validation Sample 
Label 
Demographic Model 
Adjusted Average per Capita 
Cost (AAPCC) 
DCG Models 
Principal Inpatient 
Diagnostic Cost Groups (PIPDCG) 
All-Diagnoses Diagnostic 
Cost Groups (ADDCG) 
HCC Models 
Hierarchical Coexisting Conditions 
Model (HCC) 
Hierarchical Coexisting Conditions 
and Procedures Model (HCCP) 
Hierarchical Coexisting Conditions, 
Procedures, and Hospitalizations 
Model (HCCPH) 
Prospective 
Models 
Concurrent 
Models 
Percent 
1.02 
5.53 
6.34 
8.08 
8.73 
9.01 
1.02 
41.95 
33.04 
40.74 
46.59 
54.74 
NOTES: All models include 12 age-sex cells. The dependent variable 
for all models is annualized 1992 Medicare payments. Prospective 
models use diagnoses, procedures, and hospitalizations on 1991 
claims whereas concurrent models use 1992 diagnoses, procedures, 
and hospitalizations. 
SOURCE: 1991 and 1992 Medicare Claims. 
models. Four points are salient First, all 
models incorporating diagnostic inform-
ation have vastly greater explanatory power 
than our AAPCC model. The R2 for our 
AAPCC model is 1.02 percent, whereas the 
lowest R2 among the models incorporating 
diagnosis (the PIPDCG model) is 5.53 per-
cent, more than a five-fold improvement 
Second, the all-diagnoses DCG model 
demonstrates a surprisingly modest 
improvement over the PIPDCG model, with 
an increase of only 0.81 percentage points in 
the R2. Knowing the most serious inpatient 
diagnosis achieves 87 percent of the predic-
tive power of knowing all (inpatient and out-
patient) diagnoses in a DCG framework.6 
Third, prospective HCC models have 
greater explanatory power than prospective 
DCG models that use equivalent inform-
6We also tested a specification in which we separately distinguish 
principal inpatient diagnosis from all other diagnoses in a DCG 
framework. This specification (not shown in Table 3) obtained an 
R2 of 7.08, a further improvement of 0.74 over the ADDCG model. 
ation. For example, the HCC model (R2 = 
8.08 percent) uses essentially the same 
information as the ADDCG model (R2 = 6.34 
percent). Fourth, only a modest amount of 
explanatory power is lost by excluding hos-
pitalizations and procedures entirely from a 
prospective HCC payment model. Excluding 
both hospitalizations and procedures from 
the payment model lowers the R2 by about 1 
percentage point, from 9.01 percent to 8.08 
percent, a 10-percent drop. 
Explaining at best only 9 percent of the 
variation in Medicare payments, as the 
prospective risk-adjustment models do, 
may seem disappointing, leaving a full 91 
percent unexplained. Yet much of medical 
expenditures are associated with inherent-
ly random events that are unpredictable 
even by a hypothetically perfect prospec-
tive model. The maximum explainable 
portion of medical expenditure variation 
is estimated at only 20-25 percent 
(Newhouse, 1995; van Vliet and van de 
Ven, 1993). Thus, the models presented in 
this article may explain nearly one-half of 
the explainable variance. Moreover, it is 
precisely this explainable portion of the 
dispersion in medical expenditures that is 
important to predict. It is the observable 
aspects of health and other characteristics 
predictably associated with future medical 
expenditures (e.g., chronic medical condi-
tions) that health plans and beneficiaries 
can use as a basis for selection behavior. 
Random medical occurrences are unpre-
dictable, and thus are true insurable 
events. The risk from them can be mini-
mized by averaging through sufficiently 
large enrollee pools. 
Concurrent Models 
As previously discussed, we also esti-
mated DCG and HCC model variants in 
which the classification of DXGROUPs into 
DCGs and HCCs was optimized to predict 
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1992 Medicare payments using 1992 (con-
current year) information instead of 1991 
(prior year) information. The R2 statistics 
from five concurrent risk adjustment mod-
els are shown in the far right column of 
Table 3. As before, these are calculated 
from the validation sample, and hence do 
not reflect possible overfitting. 
The R2s from concurrent models are 
substantially higher than for the prospec-
tive models, ranging from 33.04 percent for 
the ADDCG model to 54.74 percent for the 
HCCPH model. The PIPDCG model does 
better than the ADDCG model, probably 
largely because PIPDCGs distinguish peo-
ple who were hospitalized in 1992 from 
those who were not.7 The concurrent HCC 
model achieves an R2 of 40.74 percent. 
Incorporating procedural and hospital-
ization information into the concurrent 
HCC models results in a larger improve-
ment in the R2 than when it is included in 
the prospective models. Adding 11 pro-
cedure groups improves the R2 by 5.85 
percentage points, and adding hospital-
izations improves the R2 by a further 8.15 
percentage points. This is not a surpris-
ing result, because procedural and hospi-
talization information is signaling what is 
done to a patient. If an expanded set of 
procedures and hospitalization dummies 
were used, even more of the variation 
could be explained, but at the cost of 
compromising incentives to avoid unnec-
essary treatments. 
If the R2 were the only measure of pre-
dictive power, then the concurrent models 
would be the clear favorites. Our concur-
rent risk-adjustment models explain much 
more of the variation in same year pay-
ments than prospective models, in part 
because they are adjusting payments for 
acute conditions (heart attack, pneumo-
nia, stroke) which although expensive, are 
7A simple binary variable for hospitalization in 1992 (plus 12 age 
and sex cells) achieves an R2 of 31.8 percent. 
difficult to predict prospectively. Yet this 
information is also difficult for enrollees or 
health plans to predict and use for selec-
tion, thus making it less important for risk 
adjustment. The advantage of concurrent 
over prospective models is less clear when 
relevant information potentially available 
to enrollees and plans is used to evaluate 
predictive power. 
Predictive Ratios 
Table 4 shows predictive ratios for our 
AAPCC model, five prospective risk-adjust-
ment models, and five concurrent risk 
adjustment models for 51 non-random 
groups of beneficiaries from our validation 
sample. The predictive ratio is calculated 
as the total predicted 1992 payment for a 
group divided by the actual 1992 payment 
for that same group. A model performs 
well for a group when its predictive ratio is 
close to one; this indicates that aggregate 
payments under the risk-adjustment model 
will be very close to payments under the 
existing FFS system. The diagnostic codes 
of the chronic condition groups for valida-
tion were defined by a physician at HCFA 
without our input. Chronic condition vali-
dation groups are assigned from diagnoses 
on 1991 (prior year) claims. 
All models do well when comparing 
across subgroups of the population that are 
defined purely by age and sex, factors used 
for risk adjustment. These predictive ratios 
are close to, but not exactly, one, because 
of sampling error resulting from the split 
sample design. 
For chronic conditions, all diagnosis-
based models do considerably better than 
our AAPCC model. Across a wide range of 
chronic conditions, the predictive ratios for 
our AAPCC range between 0.40-0.84, indi-
cating that the AAPCC is underpaying for 
these people. However, under the prospec-
tive HCCP model, for example, this meas-
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ure ranges from a low of 0.87 for depression 
to a high of 1.06 for breast cancer. For peo-
ple with any of these chronic conditions in 
1991, our AAPCC underpays by 18 percent 
on average, the prospective HCCP model 
by only 2 percent. For most of the chronic 
conditions, predicted payments from the 
HCC models are within $500 of actual pay-
ments, compared with typical deviations of 
several thousand dollars under the AAPCC. 
Thus, the HCC models greatly reduce 
incentives for favorable selection. 
The prospective models predict costs for 
previously-diagnosed chronic conditions 
nearly as well as the concurrent models, 
despite their much lower R2s. The R2 
advantage of concurrent models clearly 
lies in explaining expenditure variation 
associated with acute or newly diagnosed 
conditions, not with pre-existing chronic 
conditions that could be used by health 
plans to avoid high-cost enrollees. 
Looking from left to right across the 
columns for the different prospective or 
concurrent models demonstrates a general 
improvement in these measures, consistent 
with their overall explanatory power as mea-
sured by R2. Multiple-condition HCC mod-
els generally do better than the single-diag-
nosis DCG models. The HCC model— 
which omits many of the more problematic 
and discretionary diagnoses, does not 
reward hospitalizations relative to outpa-
tient treatment, and ignores procedure 
information—achieves predictive ratios that 
compare favorably with the other models. 
Many of the diagnoses falling into the 
chronic conditions selected by HCFA are 
themselves used for risk adjustment under 
the DCG and HCC frameworks. A more 
stringent test is to look at 1991 expenditure 
quintiles and 1991 hospital admission 
groups. Again, all models do substantially 
better than our AAPCC, and there is a gen-
eral improvement moving to the more 
highly predictive models. Prospective and 
concurrent models do almost equally well. 
The HCC and HCCP models only under-
pay the 1991 highest-expenditure quintile 
by 10 to about 15 percent, whereas our 
AAPCC underpays by more than 50 per-
cent. Enrollees with three or more hospi-
talizations in 1991 are underpaid by about 
20 percent under the HCC and HCCP mod-
els, versus a 70-percent underpayment 
with our AAPCC. 
Incorporating diagnosis substantially 
reduces the opportunities for risk selection 
based on prior utilization, but does not 
eliminate them. The average profit in 1992 
from enrolling someone in the lowest quin-
tile of 1991 expenditures risk adjusting by 
our AAPCC is $2,134. Using the prospec-
tive HCC model to risk adjust lowers this 
potential profit to $424. Similarly, the aver-
age loss from enrolling someone in the 
highest quintile of 1991 expenditures is 
-$4,425 under the AAPCC, and -$1,311 
using the HCC model. 
Concurrent models match payments to 
expenditures considerably better than 
prospective models or our AAPCC for con-
current (1992) expenditure quintiles and 
numbers of hospitalizations, consistent with 
their much higher R2 in explaining 1992 
expenditures. For example, the concurrent 
HCC model underpredicts expenditures for 
the highest 1992 quintile by only 26 percent, 
compared with 76 percent by our AAPCC and 
66 percent by the prospective HCC model. 
Distribution of Expenditures 
Medical expenditures are highly skewed: 
In a given year, most people have relatively 
modest expenditures, but a few have very 
large expenditures. The far right column of 
Table 5 illustrates that in 1992, three-fourths of 
Medicare beneficiaries in our sample cost less 
than $2,917, whereas the top one percent cost 
more than $57,000 each. Very high expendi-
tures may represent unpredictable acute 
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medical crises that no prospective risk-adjust-
ment model can predict However, good risk-
adjustment models should, to some degree, 
reproduce the highly skewed nature of medi-
cal expenditures by predicting the upper tail of 
the distribution. 
Table 5 shows that our AAPCC model cannot 
predict the tail Its maximum predicted expen-
ditures is only $7,710, and its range from maxi-
mum to minimum is only $5,324. Adding diag-
nostic information allows much higher-cost indi-
viduals to be identified. For example, the 
prospective ADDCG model has a maximum 
payment of $21,543. The multiple condition 
HCC models predict greater maximum expen-
ditures than the single-condition DCG models 
because the sickest individuals tend to suffer 
from multiple medical problems. The life-sus-
taining procedures are particularly useful in pre-
dicting the very high costs of a small number of 
individuals whose full expense cannot be ascer-
tained from diagnoses alone. Incorporating 
hospitalizations raises predictions for the 
upper 5-10 percent of enrollees. Concurrent 
models, with their ability to capture expendi-
tures associated with acute medical events, 
achieve roughly double the predicted amounts 
of the corresponding prospective models in the 
upper tail. 
Because the mean predicted expenditure 
is the same for all models (at $3,773), the 
extended upper tail of the diagnosis-based 
models is achieved by paying less at the 
lower and middle parts of the distribution. 
Our AAPCC model pays a minimum of 
$2,386, whereas the prospective HCC and 
HCCP models pay only about $1,100 for the 
youngest and healthiest beneficiaries (i.e., 
for a 65- to 69-year-old female with no diag-
noses included in the payment models). The 
ADDCG model, which incorporates inform-
ation from all diagnoses, not just the higher, 
cost conditions that are the focus of the 
HCCs, does a slightly better job at predicting 
the lower cost end of the distribution than 
the HCC models. 
All concurrent models except the 
PIPDCG generate negative predicted costs 
for some individuals, at the very lowest per-
centiles of the distribution. This occurs 
because the coefficients on the oldest age 
groups are negative in all of the concurrent 
models that we estimated using all diag-
noses. Our explanation for this is that the 
intensity of treatment for the most elderly 
individuals with a given condition is lower 
than for younger populations. The oldest 
individuals are also the most likely to have 
multiple conditions. The age dummies are 
attempting to adjust payments downward to 
offset this higher predicted payments, 
resulting in negative predictions for those in 
the oldest age groups not identified with any 
medical conditions included in the model. 
This problem could possibly be eliminated 
by exploring the use of interactions between 
age and the HCCs, which was beyond the 
scope of this project, or by ommitting age-
sex variables from the concurrent risk-
adjustment models. 
ADDITIONAL SPECIFICATIONS 
We also investigated the usefulness of sev-
eral alternative specifications. These variants 
differ in their dependent variables, samples, or 
in their explanatory variables (Table 6). The 
HCC model is the baseline for evaluating the 
explanatory power of additional variables or 
models. All models presented in Table 6 are 
prospective, and all R2 statistics are calculated 
from the model development sample half, and 
thus, are not directly comparable to the vali-
dation sample R2s reported in Table 3. For 
comparison, the prospective HCC model's R2 
calculated on the development sample (8.62 
percent) is shown at the top of Table 3. 
Aged Versus Disabled Subsamples 
Medicare currently has separate AAPCC 
risk-adjustment factors for aged and dis-
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Table 5 
Distribution of Predicted 1992 Expenditures From Alternative Risk Adjustment Models and 
Actual 1992 Expenditures 
Percentile 
Maximum 
99 
95 
90 
75 
50 
25 
10 
5 
1 
Minimum 
Maximum 
99 
95 
90 
75 
50 
25 
10 
5 
1 
Minimum 
AAPCC* 
$7,710 
6,642 
5,687 
5,085 
4,571 
3,614 
2,902 
2,386 
2,386 
2,386 
2,386 
PIPDCG 
$26,324 
14,768 
9,330 
7,236 
3,935 
2,899 
2,258 
1,859 
1,859 
1,859 
1,859 
PIPDCG 
$38,356 
31,207 
23,519 
14,060 
1,413 
851 
682 
546 
546 
393 
393 
ADDCG 
$21,543 
14,264 
9,495 
7,324 
5,031 
2,919 
1,965 
1,239 
892 
735 
735 
ADDCG 
$40,448 
27,548 
17,801 
13,345 
4,639 
1,045 
619 
336 
22 
-227 
-227 
Prospective Models 
HCC 
$44,137 
16,364 
10,202 
7,818 
4,853 
2,845 
1,796 
1,411 
1,162 
1,162 
1,162 
Concurrent Models 
HCC 
$97,955 
34,570 
18,730 
12,175 
4,442 
1,086 
204 
96 
-64 
-407 
-407 
HCCP 
$78,176 
16,724 
10,201 
7,762 
4,826 
2,803 
1,751 
1,349 
1,098 
1,098 
1,098 
HCCP 
$200,253 
35,089 
18,114 
11,790 
4,369 
1,006 
261 
193 
76 
-179 
-179 
HCCPH 
$75,363 
17,491 
10,397 
7,688 
4,726 
2,790 
1,782 
1,371 
1,113 
1,113 
1,113 
HCCPH 
$205,806 
36,695 
20,283 
13,767 
3,279 
284 
195 
160 
-74 
-101 
-101 
Actual Expenditures 
$1,533,060 
57,423 
22,810 
12,227 
2,917 
516 
95 
0 
0 
0 
0 
* Represented by 12 age-sex cells and Medicaid eligibility. 
NOTE: Predicted values are for validation sample half. All expenditures (including "actual expenditures") represent annualized amounts. 
SOURCE: 1991 and 1992 Medicare claims 
abled beneficiaries. We tested whether sub-
stantial differences exist between the esti-
mated parameters of the HCC payment 
model for the aged and disabled sub-popula-
tions. Although the percentage of variance 
explained is higher among the disabled than 
the elderly (12.2 versus 8.4 percent), the esti-
mated parameters are remarkably similar on 
the whole. Thus, allowing different coeffi-
cients for the aged and disabled only raises 
the combined sample R2 from 8.62 percent 
to 8.69 percent (Table 6). Therefore, a com-
bined risk-adjustment model for the aged 
and disabled is appropriate. Real differences 
do exist for substance abuse and high-cost 
psychiatric diagnoses, with the disabled con-
siderably more expensive than the elderly. 
These differences could be recognized in a 
combined model by paying extra for dis-
abled beneficiaries with these diagnoses. 
Medicaid Status 
Medicare's current AAPCC methodolo-
gy uses Medicaid enrollment status as a 
risk-adjustment factor. Medicaid status 
adds a modest amount of predictive power 
to the HCC model, raising the R2 from 
8.62 to 8.71 percent. Medicaid enrollees 
are nearly $1,000 more expensive than 
non-Medicaid enrollees holding constant 
age, sex, and diagnosis, providing a basis 
for risk selection by health plans. 
Including Medicaid status as a risk 
adjuster could improve access to care of 
dual Medicare-Medicaid eligibles by elim-
inating incentives for health plans to avoid 
them. On the other hand, Medicaid eligi-
bility rules vary across the States, and it is 
not clear that Medicaid status is a proxy 
for exogenous differences in health stat-
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Table 6 
Explanatory Power of Alternative Prospective Models, Model Development Sample* 
Model or Factor 
Base Case 
HCC Model 
Sub-Samples 
Separate Models for Aged and Disabled 
Risk Adjusters Added Individually to HCC Model 
Medicaid Eligibility 
Linear Age Plus Sex Dummy 
(Replaces 12 Age and Sex Cells) 
1991 Expenditures 
Cancer, Heart Disease, Stroke, Diabetes, 
COPD Interactions 
Alternative Risk Adjusters 
Cancer, Heart Disease, and Stroke 
Plus Age and Sex 
Cancer, Heart Disease, Stroke, Diabetes, 
COPD Plus Age and Sex 
Cancer, Heart Disease, Stroke, Diabetes, 
COPD Plus Interactions and Age and Sex 
1991 Expenditures Plus Age and Sex 
1991 Hospitalization Dummy Plus Age and Sex 
Transformed Dependent Variable 
Expenditures Deflated by Geographic Input Price Index (G1PI) 
Top-Coded at $50,000 
Top-Coded at $25,000 
Logged (1 + $) 
Continuous Update Model 
HCC Model 
R2 
Percent 
8.62 
8.69 
8.71 
8.62 
9.79 
8.64 
3.82 
4.93 
5.02 
7.04 
3.94 
8.88 
13.93 
14.83 
18.75 
24.08 
Comments 
Base case for comparison 
With few exceptions, parameter estimates 
are not substantially different. 
Substance abuse and mental health 
expenditures are higher for the disabled. 
Coefficient = $958, Standard Error = $39. 
Eligibility rules vary by State. 
Negligible gain for either aged or 
disabled subsamples. 
Coefficient = $0.21, Standard Error < $0.01. 
COPD is chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease. 
— 
— 
— 
Coefficient = $0.38, Standard Error < $0.01. 
PIPDCG model R2 = 5.88 Percent 
GIPI measures area variation in wages 
and other prices. 
Simulates outlier pool with 
$50,000 threshold. 
Simulates outlier pool with 
$25,000 threshold. 
Medical expenditures are highly 
skewed. 
One month's expenditures are predicted using 
the preceding 12 months' diagnoses. 
*Because these R2s are computed on the model development sample, they are not directly comparable to the R2s in Table 3 computed on the valida-
tion sample. For example, the HCC model has an R2 of 8.62 percent on the model development sample and an R2 of 8.08 percent on the validation 
sample. In general, the validation sample R2s will be lower. 
SOURCE: 1991 and 1992 Medicare claims. 
us.8 Whether to include Medicaid status in 
a Medicare risk adjustment model is a 
decision for policymakers. 
Simplified Lists of Conditions 
Excluding many diagnoses from pay-
ment models reduces their explanatory 
8For example, the higher costs of Medicaid eligibles could be 
because of their use of higher price sources of care, such as hos-
pital emergency rooms, rather than physicians' offices, an ineffi-
ciency that should be eliminated by a well run managed care plan. 
power only slightly, raising the question of 
how far exclusions and aggregations can 
proceed without substantially reducing 
explanatory power. We investigated this by 
estimating two prospective models with 
highly simplified lists of coexisting condi-
tions. The first includes the three leading 
killers of Americans: heart disease, cancer, 
and stroke. These three conditions plus 
age and sex explain nearly four times as 
much of the variance in expenditures as 
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the AAPCC model, but less than one-half 
as much as the HCC model. Adding dia-
betes and chronic lung disease to these 
three raises the R2 by another percentage 
point to nearly 5 percent. Although better 
than the AAPCC, it still falls well short of 
the HCC model. If complete and accurate 
diagnostic information is available, we rec-
ommend use of the HCC model. The sim-
plified models may be useful in situations 
of incomplete information, possibly for new 
Medicare enrollees or when only self-
reported medical conditions are available. 
Interactions Among Conditions 
We also investigated whether accounting 
for interactions among medical conditions 
would add substantially to the explanatory 
power of diagnosis-based risk adjustment 
models. We first added the 10 first-order inter-
action terms among the five conditions in the 
"simplified conditions" model previously 
described to that model. Adding the interac-
tions increased the R2 only slightly, from 4.93 
percent to 5.02 percent Next, we added the 
same set of 10 aggregated interactions to the 
HCC model, which increased its explanatory 
power only from 8.62 to 8.64 percent We also 
tried weighting a person's conditions more or 
less heavily based on the total number of con-
ditions he or she has, but found no meaning-
ful improvement in explanatory power (Ellis 
et al., 1996). We conclude that a simple linear, 
additive relationship among multiple diagnos-
tic categories provides a good fit to the data. 
Because non-linear interactions among condi-
tions add complexity to risk-adjustment mod-
els with little apparent gain in explanatory 
power, we recommend the simple linear form. 
Prior Utilization Measures 
In previous research, prior utilization 
measures have been found to be the most 
highly predictive risk-adjustment variables 
(Thomas and Lichtenstein, 1986; van Vliet 
and van de Ven, 1990). For comparison 
with our diagnosis-based models, we 
examined two measures of prior utilization: 
expenditures and hospitalization. Prior 
year expenditures has a fairly high 
explanatory power of 7.04 percent, less 
than the predictive power of the HCC mod-
els. When expenditures is added to the 
HCC payment model, the R2 rises from 
8.62 to 9.79 percent. Consistent with the 
predictive ratio results, there remains 
some possibility of risk selection within the 
HCC model using prior year expenditures, 
but much smaller opportunities than with 
the AAPCC. A dummy variable for prior 
year hospitalization achieves an R2 of near-
ly 4 percent. Our diagnosis-based models 
thus have greater explanatory power than 
simple measures of prior utilization and 
avoid their undesirable incentives for over-
provision of care. 
Geographic Adjustments 
Geographic adjustments and outlier pools 
are potential additional elements of a 
complete capitated payment system. 
Geographic adjustments account for the dif-
ferential costs of providing medical care in 
different regions. The AAPCC's geographic 
adjustment is based on FFS costs in the ben-
eficiary's county of residence. This adjust-
ment is criticized for leading to huge inter-
area variations in payments (as much as 
four-fold differences across counties) and 
unstable payment rates over time (Rossiter 
and Adamache, 1989; Newhouse, 1986; 
Welch, 1992). In addition, geographic differ-
ences reflect possibly inappropriate varia-
tions in medical practice styles. We devel-
oped an alternative geographic adjustment, 
the Geographic Input Price Index (GIPI) 
using input prices (wages, building rental 
rates, etc.) measured by Medicare's 
prospective payment system area hospital 
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wage index and the Medicare fee schedule 
Geographic Adjustment Factor for physi-
cian payment (Welch, 1992). The GIPI is 
computed for Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
and state non-metropolitan areas. Excluding 
Puerto Rico, the GIPI varies only from 0.785 
in rural Mississippi to 1.272 in Oakland, 
California, where 1.000 represents the 
national average price level. Deflating 
Medicare expenditures by the GIPI adds 
only modest explanatory power to the HCC 
model: the R2 increases only from 8.62 to 
8.88 percent Thus, little expenditure varia-
tion unexplained by diagnosis, age, and sex 
is accounted for by geographic differences 
in wages and other input prices. 
Nevertheless, we believe that these exoge-
nous cost factors should be incorporated in 
Medicare capitation reimbursements. 
Capitation Outlier Pools 
Medicare does not currently use an 
outlier pool in HMO reimbursement, 
although outlier pools have been studied 
(Beebe, 1992; Keeler, Carter, and Trude, 
1988; Ellis and McGuire, 1988) and pro-
posed for payment demonstrations. 
Outlier pools offer reduced financial risk 
to providers, improved payment equity, 
and greater incentives for providers to 
enroll and treat very sick and expensive 
patients (Beebe, 1992; Keeler, Carter, 
and Trude, 1988). In a simple outlier 
pool, Medicare would reimburse an 
HMO for all of its enrollee's expendi-
tures above some annual threshold 
amount. We simulated the effect of out-
lier thresholds of $25,000 and $50,000 on 
the explanatory power of the HCC 
model, using non-annualized expendi-
tures to determine which cases exceed-
ed these thresholds. High-expenditure 
observations were not dropped, they 
were simply top-coded at the capped 
amount. The HCC model explains a 
higher proportion of capped expenditure 
variation than of total expenditure varia-
tion, but the difference is not dramatic. 
A conceptually preferable, but adminis-
tratively more complex, outlier pool 
would be based on a variable threshold 
that is a fixed deductible (e.g., $25,000) 
above the expenditure predicted by the 
HCC model (Keeler, Carter, and Trude, 
1988). Thus, the threshold triggering 
outlier payments would be greater for 
beneficiaries diagnosed with cancer than 
for those with no diagnosed illnesses. 
Continuous Update Models 
The Continuous Update Model (Ellis 
and Ash, 1989) represents a compromise 
between the better incentives of the 
prospective model and the greater 
explanatory power of the concurrent 
model. It predicts each month's expendi-
tures using diagnoses from the immedi-
ately preceding 12-month period. We 
estimated a Continuous Update Model 
using the HCCs defined for the prospec-
tive model and achieved an R2 of 24.08 
percent. This is better than any of the 
prospective models, but well short of the 
concurrent models. The Continuous 
Update Model is substantially more 
complex (administratively and computa-
tionally) than annual models because 
diagnoses and expenditures must be 
tracked by month. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Risk adjustment is increasingly recog-
nized as a critical element of reforming 
Medicare's capitation payments to HMOs 
and other managed care entities (U.S. 
General Accounting Office, 1994). Risk 
adjustment can reduce the financial risk to 
HMOs of participating in Medicare and 
thus further the policy goal of increasing 
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Medicare beneficiaries' enrollment in man-
aged care plans. It can also increase the 
equity of Medicare capitation payments. 
Risk adjustment encourages HMOs to 
compete on the quality and efficiency of 
their care rather than on attracting the 
healthiest enrollees, thereby improving 
access to HMOs of the sick and disabled. 
Claims-Based Versus Other Risk 
Adjustment 
Risk adjustment that uses diagnostic 
information on medical claims to adjust pay-
ments, such as the HCC model, appears to 
provide the best combination of ability to pre-
dict enrollee costs, incentives for appropriate 
care, resistance to manipulation by providers, 
cost effectiveness, and administrative feasibil-
ity. Surveys of self-reported enrollee health, 
chronic conditions, and functional status are 
expensive, prone to manipulation, difficult to 
validate, potentially unreliable, and have less 
predictive power (Fowles, Lawthers, and 
Weiner, 1995). Collecting direct clinical 
descriptors of health, such as blood pressure 
and cholesterol level through clinical exami-
nations, is expensive, intrusive, and less pow-
erful in explaining future utilization 
(Newhouse et al., 1989). Prior utilization of 
medical services has relatively high predictive 
power, but sets up inappropriate incentives for 
providing services (Thomas and Lichtenstein, 
1986; van Vliet and van de Ven, 1990). 
Purely financial risk sharing, without 
explicit measurement of health status, has 
also been proposed as a method of reform-
ing Medicare's HMO reimbursement 
methodology (Ellis and McGuire, 1986; 
Beebe, 1992; Newhouse, 1995). The gov-
ernment could absorb part of the cost of car-
ing for expensive Medicare enrollees (an 
outlier policy) or of all enrollees (payer cost 
sharing). The limitation of an outlier policy 
is that very high-cost cases are essentially 
random, and outlier payments do not direct 
extra reimbursement to health plans that 
enroll a systematically higher-cost (i.e., less 
healthy) population (Ellis and McGuire, 
1988). Also, the HMO has less incentive to 
manage the cost of very expensive cases or 
to avoid choosing expensive treatment 
modalities. Still, an outlier policy may have a 
role in conjunction with a risk adjuster, such 
as the HCC model, that accounts for sys-
tematic health status variation among 
enrolled populations. 
An expanded outlier policy would have the 
government absorb some share of the total 
actual cost of providing care to Medicare 
beneficiaries, say one-half, in addition to pay-
ing a reduced, predetermined capitated 
amount This hybrid of FFS and capitated 
payment systems, it is argued, balances the 
incentives for over-provision of services 
inherent in FFS against the incentives for 
under-provision of services inherent in capi-
tation (Ellis and McGuire, 1993; Newhouse, 
1995).9 A partial capitation system is consis-
tent with a risk-adjustment model because 
the capitated portion of payment could be 
adjusted for beneficiary health status. 
However, such a system clearly reduces 
incentives for cost containment (this is by 
design) and may be unfair to efficient plans. 
Also, a partial capitation system (or an outlier 
system) would be much more difficult to 
implement than the HCC model because, to 
measure costs, it requires comprehensive 
service utilization data from HMOs, plus 
agreement on an algorithm to assign costs to 
utilization. In contrast, the HCC model 
requires only demographic and diagnostic 
(and, perhaps, some procedural) information. 
Incentives in Risk Adjustment 
One goal of risk adjustment for payment 
purposes is to accurately predict expendi-
tures, but another is to establish incentives 
9Incentives for underservice in Medicare capitation may be lim-
ited by the ability of Medicare enrollees to return to the FFS sec-
tor and competition among health plans for enrollees. 
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for appropriate, cost effective medical care. 
We considered diagnosis, certain medical 
procedures, and hospitalization as risk 
adjusters in addition to demographics. Risk 
adjustment based on diagnosis alone estab-
lishes the strongest incentives to avoid 
excessive medical care. Providers are not 
paid more for what they do, only for the 
diagnostic health status of their enrollees. 
Using diagnosis only to risk adjust is also 
fairer. Efficient plans that avoid hospitaliza-
tions and eschew aggressive, procedure-
oriented styles of care are not penalized. 
One of our key findings is that the medical 
procedures we considered and hospitaliza-
tions add relatively little predictive power to 
diagnoses, especially in prospective mod-
els. Thus, acceptably high explanatory 
power can be achieved in a payment model 
without sacrificing strong incentives to 
avoid unnecessary care or rewarding 
aggressive, intensive styles of medical prac-
tice. In addition, we found that many com-
mon, low-cost, ambiguous or discretionary 
diagnoses can be excluded from payment 
models with limited reduction in predictive 
power. This exclusion greatly reduces the 
incentives and ability of health plans to 
manipulate coding practices to increase 
reimbursement. In short, a simple yet pow-
erful risk-adjustment model with strong 
incentives to avoid excessive medical care 
and resistance to coding manipulation can 
be built from a parsimonious set of high-
cost diagnoses. This is the HCC model. 
Prospective Versus Concurrent Risk 
Adjustment 
Diagnosis-based risk adjustment can be 
done either prospectively or concurrently. 
Our results show that either prospective or 
concurrent methods predict costs equally 
well, on average, for people diagnosed with 
chronic conditions or hospitalized in the 
prior year. Also, the models are equally 
powerful in predicting expenditures for 
particularly high- or low-cost groups in the 
previous year. Thus, either model should 
attenuate incentives for risk selection by 
health plans about equally well. 
Concurrent models explain costs in 
the current year much better than 
prospective models, but much of current 
year expenditure variation results from 
random acute medical events. By defini-
tion, these events are unpredictable and 
cannot be used for risk selection. Acute 
conditions are true insurable events that 
average out in relatively small random 
panels of enrollees (Ellis et al., 1996). 
Concurrent models thus have an advan-
tage over prospective models in reduc-
ing unsystematic risk only in small 
enrollee groups. 
Concurrent models establish poorer 
incentives for diagnostic coding and 
appropriate medical care than prospective 
models. Payment weights are generally 
larger in concurrent models, providing 
greater incentives for inappropriate coding 
of diagnoses. Moreover, the higher pay-
ment weights are attached to acute medi-
cal conditions, which, because of their 
transitory nature, could potentially be 
harder to audit and verify than chronic 
conditions. For example, multiple organ 
system failures (acute renal failure, respi-
ratory failure) often could be coded or not 
for dying individuals. We excluded the 
diagnoses respiratory arrest and cardiac 
arrest from our concurrent models 
because they could be coded for anyone 
who dies. Also, certain potentially avoid-
able, but very high-cost, acute diagnoses 
(gangrene, peritonitis) that are sometimes 
indicators of poor quality of care 
(Weissman, Gatsonis, and Epstein, 1992) 
are paid more in a concurrent model. In 
short, concurrent models may be less 
appropriate as payment models, but par-
ticularly useful where payment incentives 
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are of less concern, such as for physician 
profiling. They also may be useful as a risk 
adjuster in situations where patients are 
triaged to providers on an acute care basis. 
Diagnostic Coding Accuracy 
The validity and reliability of our risk 
adjustment models depends on the accu-
racy of diagnoses coded on Medicare 
claims. In a preliminary study (Pope et al., 
1994), we examined the internal consis-
tency of diagnostic and other information 
coded on the 1991 Medicare claims in our 
sample. Our sense from this and other 
analysis (Fowles et al., 1995; Weiner et al., 
1995) is that the diagnoses coded on FFS 
claims are probably generally accurate 
(i.e., actually present), but that coding of 
comorbidities is incomplete. The com-
pleteness of coded diagnoses would 
improve if they were the basis for capitat-
ed payment, but the veracity of the diag-
noses would be more open to question. 
Rebasing of payment weights will be nec-
essary as coding practices evolve. 
The diagnoses we used for model 
development are coded on FFS reim-
bursement claims. For capitated pay-
ment, HMOs and other managed care 
organizations would have to supply diag-
nostic information. Many of these organi-
zations have not historically maintained 
detailed encounter-level data with diag-
nosis and procedure, especially for 
ambulatory encounters. This lack of 
information could prove an impediment 
to widespread early adoption of a risk-
adjustment system incorporating ambu-
latory diagnoses. A phased introduction 
may make sense, with risk adjustment 
first based on widely available, accurate, 
and auditable diagnoses such as principal 
inpatient diagnoses, then proceeding to 
incorporate other hospital and physician 
diagnoses as the necessary data systems 
are developed. HCFA could spur the nec-
essary data collection by paying only the 
rate for a healthy person unless complete 
and accurate diagnostic data is supplied 
by a health plan. Any claims-based risk-
adjustment model implemented for pay-
ment purposes will require careful moni-
toring to ensure that health plans do not 
behave undesirably. 
Future Research 
Several directions for future work on 
risk adjustment are particularly important. 
HCFA-funded research is currently ongo-
ing (Arlene Ash, Principal Investigator) 
calibrating risk adjustment models to other 
samples, such as the under 65 years of age, 
employed, and Medicaid populations. That 
project is adapting the DXGROUP classifi-
cation system to better reflect pregnancy-
related conditions and infant, childhood, 
and young adult disorders that are rare 
among the aged Medicare population. The 
age profile of expenditures for certain diag-
nostic conditions deserves further consid-
eration. Carve-outs for particular groups of 
conditions, such as mental health and sub-
stance abuse, is another useful direction 
for research. Calibrating the model on 
HMO encounter data would indicate if pay-
ment weights are affected by HMO versus 
FFS practice patterns.10 It would also be 
informative to expand the cost and expen-
diture measure to encompass all medical 
expenditures, including deductibles, 
copayments, Medicaid-covered expenses, 
drugs, dental, eye, long-term care, and 
other services not covered by Medicare. 
Finally, more work on concurrent and con-
tinuous update risk adjustment models and 
combinations of concurrent and prospec-
tive models is warranted. 
10Dun et al. (1995) found that the performance of alternative risk 
adjustment models was insensitive to type of health plan (indem-
nity, IPA, PPO, HMO), region, etc., although the study was lim-
ited to private employed group data. 
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